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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1973 oil crisis, the causes and macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks 
remain relevant issues for academics and policymakers. Where do oil price shocks come 
from? How are they transmitted? What are their macroeconomic impacts? Which policies 
appear promising in helping an economy adjust to such shocks? Indeed, understanding the 
causes of oil price shocks and quantifying the magnitude of their impacts on the 
macroeconomy is crucial for designing appropriate policy responses. The three essays in 
this dissertation extend recent advances in the oil shocks literature to investigate the 
underlying causes of oil price shocks and examine the macroeconomic effects of the shocks 
on oil-importing countries.  
The first essay (contained in Chapter 3) uses a structural Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) model of the global crude oil market to identify the underlying causes of oil price 
shocks and quantify the contributions of the different sources of the shocks. Empirical 
results reveal that oil price shocks are caused by distinct supply and demand shocks: an oil 
supply shock caused by disruptions in global oil production; an aggregate demand shock 
driven by changes in global economic activity; and an oil-specific demand shock driven by 
shifts in precautionary demand for oil due to uncertainties about future oil supply shortfalls. 
An unexpected oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory increase in the real price 
of oil; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes a strong increase in the real 
price of oil; and an unanticipated increase in precautionary demand for oil triggers an 
immediate and large increase in the real price of oil.  
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In the second essay (Chapter 4), I propose a two-step modeling framework that 
combines the structural VAR model and panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
model to examine the elasticities of oil import demand to oil price shocks for a sample of 
30 oil-importing countries: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and non-OECD. The elasticity estimates show that import demand for oil is less 
sensitive to oil price shocks driven by supply disturbances but highly sensitive to oil price 
shocks driven by aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks. Dividing the 
sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, both groups are found to be identical in their 
responses to oil supply shocks but they differ in their responses to aggregate demand and 
precautionary demand shocks.  
The final essay (Chapter 5) estimates the effects of oil price shocks on the 
macroeconomic performance of 14 OECD oil-importing countries. Utilizing a block 
recursive VAR, the results show that increases in the price of oil driven by oil supply 
shocks and precautionary demand shocks are inflationary and unfavorable for economic 
growth while increases in the price of oil driven by aggregate demand shocks are 
inflationary but increase the rhythm of economic activity. Also, Chapter 5 evaluates 
whether structural differences matter for the impact of oil shocks across countries, focusing 
on the role of oil intensity defined as the share of oil consumption in total energy 
consumption.   
The overarching conclusion of the dissertation is that oil price shocks do not 
originate solely from the exogenous supply shocks but also originate from the endogenous 
demand shocks. Consequently, the macroeconomic effects of the shocks as well as the 
appropriate policy responses crucially depend on the source of the shock. 
For my parents, Adama and Mohammed. 
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The world economy is inherently unstable. It enjoys periods of relative calmness 
and occasionally experiences major shocks. These shocks include the panics of the 1870s, 
the financial crashes of the 1920s, the oil shocks of the 1970s, developing countries’ debt 
crisis in the 1980s, the Asian currency crisis in the 1990s, and the financial crisis in the 
2000s. Interestingly, among all these major shocks to the world economy, oil shocks 
exhibit the most remarkable degree of recurrence, occurring roughly once every decade 
since the 1970s.  
Figure 1.1 provides graphical representation of oil shocks based on data from the 
United States Energy Information Administration (EIA). In addition to the remarkable 
degree of recurrence of the shocks, two interesting observations stand out. First, the two 
extreme oil shocks (1973 and 2009) coincided with significant events in the global business 
cycle: the 1973 oil shock precipitated a major recession in industrialized countries such as 
the United States, West Germany, France, and Japan whereas the most recent oil shock in 
2009 followed the severe contraction in the global economy. Another interesting 
observation is that, whereas pre-2000 oil shocks tend to be associated with supply 
conditions, post-2000 shocks are mostly associated with demand conditions. Overall, 
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Figure 1.1 suggest that oil shocks are inextricably related with the global business cycle in 
general, and business cycles of oil-importing countries in particular.  
The need to understand the oil shocks-business cycles relationship and the 
importance that this understanding can have on macroeconomic stability raises interesting 
questions about (1) the sources of oil shocks, (2) their modes of transmission, (3) the 
magnitudes of their impact, and (4) the appropriate policy responses. Motivated by these 
questions, the goal of this dissertation is to explore the underlying causes of oil price shocks 
and examine their dynamic effects on the macroeconomy of oil-importing countries.  
A major gap in the oil shocks literature is that almost all studies tend to focus on 
industrialized oil-importing countries such as United States, Japan, countries in Europe, 
and most recently China, but not so much on oil-importing countries in the developing 
regions of the world. Another major gap in the literature is that although oil shocks are 
widely accepted as terms of trade shocks transmitted to oil-importing countries through 
their demand for imported oil, the literature completely ignores the impact of oil price 
shocks on oil import demand. A final gap in the literature is that it is dated. In fact, the 
most recent study that applies structural VAR model to disentangle oil price shocks – 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) – uses data from 1973-2009. 
To address these three gaps, I extend the sample to include other major oil-
importing countries in the developing regions of the world, that is, Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America in addition to United States, Japan, and countries in Europe. Also, I adopt a more 
systematic approach to model the causes and macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks on 
oil-importing countries. More specifically, since the transmission of oil shocks begins with 
oil import demand before affecting other macroeconomic variables such as inflation and 
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real output, I begin the analysis by identifying the oil price shocks and estimating their 
impact on oil import demand before proceeding to gauge the effects of the shocks on 
inflation and real output growth. Finally, I use more recent data spanning from 1980-2013. 
1.2 Contributions 
My contributions to the literature are three-fold. First, my decomposition of the 
structural disturbances to the real price of oil provide new evidence that the increase in the 
real price of oil between 2009 and 2010 is driven in most part by aggregate demand shocks 
despite the sluggish global economic activity post-2008 recession. However, the increase 
in the real price of oil from 2011 to 2013, is driven mainly by precautionary demand 
motives due to uncertainties about future oil supply shortfalls. Supply disturbances played 
a marginal role during these two periods. 
Second, I provide new evidence that changes in oil import demand across oil-
importing countries (OECD and non-OECD) are not only responsive to supply-driven oil 
price shocks as commonly believed, but also responsive to aggregate demand and 
precautionary demand-driven oil price shocks. More specifically, supply-driven oil price 
shocks cause mild transitory decrease in oil import demand whereas demand-driven oil 
price shocks (aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks) trigger a strong 
increase in oil import demand. 
Finally, I provide new evidence that oil-intensity – defined as the percent of oil 
consumption in total energy consumption – can explain the differences in the effects of oil 
supply shocks across oil-importing OECD countries but it cannot explain the differences 
in the effects of aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks. 
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1.3 Organization 
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on 
oil shocks and the macroeconomy. In Chapter 3, I disentangle oil price shocks using a 
structural VAR model of the global crude oil market. In Chapter 4, I propose a two-step 
modeling framework that combines the structural VAR model and the panel ARDL model 
to estimate the elasticities of oil import demand to the decomposed oil price shocks for a 
sample of 30 oil-importing countries (18 OECD and 12 non-OECD). Chapter 5 uses a block 
recursive structural VAR model to examine the effects of oil price shocks on the 
macroeconomy of 14 OECD countries. 
Figure 1.1 Percent change in nominal oil price (1970-2013) 
CHAPTER 2 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON OIL SHOCKS 
AND THE MACROECONOMY 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between oil shocks and the macroeconomy is well-documented in 
literature. This chapter reviews the leading explanations on the several channels through 
which oil shocks can affect the macroeconomy. 
2.2 Supply Shocks 
In the history of economic growth and development of industrialized countries, 
energy was always considered nearly ubiquitous (Tsai, 1980). Not only was it essential but 
also abundant and inexpensive. The relative abundance of low-priced energy promoted the 
development of energy-intensive industries in many countries. For instance, countries like 
the Great Britain, France, and Germany, which were once largely self-sufficient in energy 
needs because of their domestic coal production became increasingly dependent on cheaper 
imported oil. Other industrial nations like Italy and Japan, which were already dependent 
on energy imports greatly increased the extent of their dependence as their economies 
advanced and their energy demand increased. Even the United States which had been 
largely self-sufficient became one of the world’s largest importer in the 1970s (Cohen & 
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Hickman, 1983; Tsai, 1980). 
Then came the oil crisis in 1973 that began with the October War and followed by 
the oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These 
events dramatically signaled the end of the era of abundant oil. The unanticipated fourfold 
increase in oil prices significantly impacted the rhythm of economic activity in oil-
importing industrialized countries. The annual growth rate of industrialized countries fell 
drastically from 5.8% to 0.1%.1  With oil supply shortages resulting in soaring prices and 
inhibiting economic growth in oil-importing nations, the problem of economic growth 
became the problem of oil supply. 
As a consequence, the first-generation economic models designed in the late 1970s 
and throughout the 1980s to explain the business cycles across industrialized oil-importing 
countries naturally placed great emphasis on exogenous oil supply disturbances driven by 
events in the Middle East and the actions of OPEC. Most of the early models have been 
theoretical and generally predict that oil price shocks lead to increases in inflation and 
decreases in the rhythm of economic activity (see, for example, Branson & Rotemberg, 
1979; Bruno & Sachs, 1982; Flood & Marion, 1982; Harkness, 1982; Malinvaud, 1977; 
Sachs, 1982). These predictions were largely supported by subsequent empirical models in 
Hamilton (1983), Burbige and Harrison (1984), Santini (1985), among others. For instance, 
Hamilton (1983) finds that all but one of the United States’ recessions since World War II 
have been caused by a dramatic increase in the price of oil. Burbige and Harrison (1984) 
find similar results for the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, and Canada. 
In the 1990s, the interest in oil price shocks and the macroeconomy waned. Few 
1 Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1988, p. 180. 
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notable studies during this decade include Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), Kim and 
Loungani (1992), Mork, Olsen, and Mysen (1994), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996). 
These studies reechoed the unfavorable macroeconomic impacts of supply-driven oil price 
shocks although Bernanke et al. (1997) stressed more on the possible indirect effects of oil 
price increases on output and inflation arising from the Federal Reserve’s response to the 
inflation rather than the direct effects of oil supply shocks as emphasized by the first-
generation models. 
2.3 Demand Shocks 
The fluctuations in the real price of oil since 2000 led to a resurgence of research 
on oil markets ushering in a new era of modeling the relationship between oil shocks and 
the business cycles of oil-importing nations. Following a closer examination of the 
seemingly identical political events in the Middle East and other major oil producing 
regions, many economists began to cast doubt on the oil supply shock view and shifted 
their attention to the demand side. Examining the causal mechanism that generated the 
stagflation of the 1970s across major oil-importing countries, Barsky and Kilian (2002) 
argued that while exogenously driven oil price shocks are important for understanding the 
business cycles across oil-importing countries, the relationship between real price of oil 
and business cycles is far more complex than suggested by models of exogenous oil price 
shocks. The study emphasized that unexpected oil price increases may sometimes be 
associated with strong recessionary effects, yet may coexist with strong domestic economic 
growth at other times. In addition, changes in the real price of oil can affect the 
macroeconomic performance of oil-importing economies and changes in macroeconomic 
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conditions in oil-importing economies can also affect the real price of oil. They concluded 
that the complex interlinkages between business cycles and the global oil market conditions 
suggest that the real price of oil, like the real price of other industrial commodities, is 
endogenous with respect to global macroeconomic conditions. Thus, identifying cause and 
effect in the relationship between the price of oil and macroeconomic performance of oil-
importing economies requires a structural model of the world economy including the global 
oil market. 
In a 2009 paper, Kilian used a structural VAR model of the global oil market to 
identify the underlying demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil market and 
decomposed the real price of oil into three components: shocks caused by disruptions in 
global oil supply (oil supply shocks); shocks to global real economic activity (aggregate 
demand shocks); and shocks driven by shifts in demand for oil due to precautionary 
motives (precautionary demand shocks). His decomposition provided compelling evidence 
that demand-driven oil price shocks tend to be stronger and persistent whereas supply-
driven oil price shocks tend to be milder and transitory.  
Building on Kilian’s approach, researchers began to explore the underlying causes 
of oil price shocks and their relationship to global business cycles in general, and oil-
importing countries’ business cycles in particular. Notable among them are Baumeister and 
Peersman (2013), Chen and Hsu (2012), and Peersman and Van Robays (2009), all of 
which concluded that major oil price fluctuations since 1973 appear to be associated in 





2.4 The Role of Financial Speculation in Oil Futures Markets 
Another popular view besides the demand and supply views of oil price shocks is 
the role of speculation driven by increasing financialization in the oil futures markets.2  The 
role speculation as a major determinant of the spot price of oil gained popularity following 
the unprecedented surge in the spot price of oil from 2003-2008 and have drawn significant 
interest from academics and policymakers. The literature identifies different strands of 
explanations, which range from empirical methodologies that examine whether higher oil 
futures prices systematically precede increases in the spot price of oil (Alquist, Kilian, & 
Vigfusson, 2013; Baumeister & Kilian, 2012), to empirical methodologies that focus on 
the breakdown of the historically negative relationship between oil prices and oil 
inventories (Alquist & Kilian, 2010; Dvir & Rogoff, 2010; Hamilton, 2009; Pirrong, 2008), 
and yet others that relies on structural VAR models to identify the role of speculation taking 
account of the mutual endogeneity of all oil market variables, including the spot price and 
futures price of oil (Kilian & Murphy, 2014). Overall, the findings in the literature suggest 
that while speculative pressures played a significant role in earlier oil price shock episodes 
including 1979, 1986, and 1990, there is no evidence of such speculative demand pressures 
in oil futures market after 2003. However, the legacy of financial speculation as the cause 
of increased systemic risks in the global economy during the 2008 recession continues to 
generate strong interest about the role of speculation in the oil futures markets. 
 
                                                 
2 Oil futures contracts are financial instruments that allow traders to lock in today a price at which to buy or 
sell a fixed quantity of the commodity on a predetermined date in the future. Futures contracts can be retraded 
between issuance and maturity on futures exchanges such as the CME Group and the Intercontinental 
Exchange. Exchanges offer institutional features that allow traders to transact anonymously, reduce 
individual default risk, and ensure homogeneity of the traded commodity, making the futures market a low-





The oil shocks literature has made great strides over the last four decades. It began 
with models that invoke supply-driven oil price shocks to explain business cycles in oil-
importing economies and evolved to models that invoke demand-driven oil price shocks to 
explain the business cycles. As the demand-side story gained more relevance in the 
literature, another popular view attributed oil price increases to speculative activities in the 
oil futures markets. This view stresses that speculation has become the primary driving 
force in determining the spot price of oil. Recent studies, however, conclude that the 
existing evidence is not supportive of an important role of speculation in driving the spot 
price of oil since 2003.  
As it stands now, the prevailing conventional view is that oil price fluctuations are 
driven by supply and demand conditions in the global crude oil market. Consequently, 
understanding the causes of oil price shocks and quantifying the magnitude of their impacts 
on the macroeconomy as well as the appropriate policy responses requires a structural VAR 
model of the global crude oil market that identifies the supply and demand shocks. The 
dissertation builds on this new paradigm. However, the dissertation fills three important 
gaps in the literature. In particular, it uses more recent data and extends the sample to 
include other major oil-importing countries in the developing regions of the world in 
addition to United States, Japan, and countries in Europe. Also, the dissertation adopts a 
more systematic approach to model the causes and macroeconomic effects of oil price 
shocks on oil-importing countries. More specifically, since the transmission of oil shocks 
begins with oil import demand before affecting other macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation and real output, the dissertation begins by identifying the oil price shocks and 
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estimating their impact on oil import demand before proceeding to gauge the effects of the 







WHERE DO OIL PRICE SHOCKS COME FROM? A STRUCTURAL VAR 
 APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING THE UNDERLYING  
CAUSES OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on identifying the underlying causes of oil price shocks. It 
also quantifies the historical contributions of the different sources of the shocks. Section 
3.2 lays out the empirical methodology. Section 3.3 describes the data. Results are 
presented and discussed in Section 3.4. Robustness checks are discussed in Section 3.5. 
The chapter ends with few concluding remarks in Section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Following Kilian (2009), I define a structural VAR model of the global crude oil 
market as follows: 
24 
 A0zt = α+∑ Aizt−1 +εt (3.1) 
i=1 
where zt denotes a vector time series consisting of monthly global crude oil production 
(PRODt); an index of monthly global real economic activity (REAt); and the monthly real 
oil price (ROPt). The model allows for two years of lags. The sample period is January 
1980 to December 2013. The error term, εt, denotes the vector of serially and mutually 
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uncorrelated structural innovations. A0−1 has a recursive structure such that the reduced-
form errors et can be decomposed according to et : 
 
This model postulates that the real price of oil is determined by the intersection of 
a vertical supply curve of oil and a downward sloping demand curve for oil. Oil supply 
shocks triggered by – say, a disruption in global oil supply – move the vertical supply 
curve along the demand curve causing the real price of oil to change. Oil demand shocks 
(driven by aggregate demand shocks or oil market specific demand shocks) move the 
demand curve along the vertical supply curve, again causing the real price of oil to 
change.3 
As in Kilian (2009), I impose the following restrictions in the A  matrix. First, I 
define oil supply shocks as unpredictable innovations to global oil production and assume 
that oil supply does not respond to innovations to the demand for oil within the same 
month. This exclusion is conceivable as in practice oil-producing countries tend to be slow 
in their response to demand shocks due to increased adjustment costs of oil production 
and the uncertainty about the state of the crude oil market. Second, I define aggregate 
demand shocks as innovations to global real economic activity that cannot be explained 
based on oil supply shocks. Here, I impose the exclusion restriction that increases in the 
real price of oil driven by shocks that are specific to the oil market will not lower global 
real economic activity immediately, but with a delay of at least one month as it takes time 
                                                 
3 In structural vector autoregression terminology, an oil price shock is generally defined as a sudden unexpected change 
in the price of oil either positively or negatively. 
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for global real economic activity to adjust. This restriction captures the sluggish response 
of global real economic activity after major oil price increases. Finally, by construction, I 
attribute all other shocks to the real price of oil that cannot be explained based on oil 
supply shocks or aggregate demand shocks to changes in the demand for oil driven by 
events specific to the oil market and referred to them as oil-specific demand shocks. 
According to Kilian (2009), this latter structural shock will reflect, in particular, 
fluctuations in precautionary demand for oil due to uncertainty about future oil supply 
shortfalls. The problem, however, is that, the oil-market specific shocks could also be 
driven by several other factors including weather shocks and speculative shocks in the oil 
futures markets. Thus, conceptually, labelling oil-market specific demand shocks as 
precautionary demand shocks raises questions. 
To ascertain the main driver of shifts in oil-market specific demand shocks, I 
examine the following three questions: (1) Is there any evidence that the observed oil-
specific demand shocks are associated with unexpectedly cold winters or other weather 
shocks? I proxy unexpected cold winters or other weather shocks with U.S. temperature 
anomaly data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
examine its relationship with the monthly oil market specific demand shocks. I find no 
evidence that the observed oil-specific demand shocks are associated with unexpectedly 
cold winters or other weather shocks. More specifically, I find very low correlation 
between the weather deviations and oil specific demand shocks (0.0086) at monthly 
frequency which indicates that neither direction of causality matters.  
(2) Is there any evidence that the observed oil-specific demand shocks are 
associated with speculative shocks in the oil futures market? I estimate the correlation 
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between oil-market specific shocks and percent changes in the volume of oil traded on the 
futures market, and again, find no significant correlation between the two (correlation is 
about 0.0525) again indicating that neither direction of causality matters. In fact, empirical 
evidence in the literature suggest that while speculative pressures played a role in earlier 
oil price shock episodes including 1979, 1986, and 1990, there is no evidence of such 
speculative demand pressures in the oil futures market after 2003 (Alquist & Kilian, 2010; 
Dvir & Rogoff, 2010; Hamilton, 2009; Kilian & Murphy, 2014; Knittel & Pindyck 2013; 
Pirrong, 2008).  
(3) If the observed oil-specific demand shocks are not associated with either 
weather shocks or speculative shocks, could precautionary demand shocks driven by 
concern about future oil supply shortfalls explain the observed oil-specific demand 
shocks? Following a closer examination of past regional conflicts, I find that oil market 
specific shocks coincide with periods prior to major conflicts including the India-China 
skirmish of 1987; the Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency in Central Africa Republic, 
Congo, and Uganda that began in 1987 late 1990s; the Liberian Civil War in 1989, the 
First Gulf War and the Russian Constitutional Crisis in the early 1990s; the East Timor 
Crisis between Australia and East Timor in the late 1990s; the Second Gulf War in 2003; 
and most recently, the Arab Spring (2011) and the Syrian Civil War (2012 – ). While this 
evidence about the coincidence of shifts in oil-specific demand shocks and periods prior 
to major conflicts is circumstantial, there are no other plausible candidates for exogenous 
oil-market specific demand shocks after ruling out weather shocks and speculative shocks. 
Thus, I attribute the oil-market specific demand shocks to precautionary demand motives. 
The exclusion restrictions on A  suggests a Cholesky decomposition with a 
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specific ordering of the variables in the structural VAR as PROD → REA → ROP, to 
determine the structural shocks and their respective impact on the system. The structural 
shocks implied by the VAR model are in monthly frequency. 
 
3.3 Data 
The oil market variables are monthly data from January 1980 to December 2013 
and include world oil production, global real economic activity, and the real price of oil. 
Oil production and oil price data are obtained from the United States Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). The oil price used is the nominal refiner acquisition cost of 
imported crude oil deflated by the United States Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator, 
which is considered to be the best proxy for global price of oil in the literature. The global 
economic activity indicator is proposed in Kilian (2009) and available on his research 
webpage. All the oil market variables are expressed in detrended logs. The plots of the 
data series are shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.3. For all the variables, I can reject the null 
hypothesis of the existence of unit root at the 10% level using Augmented Dicky-Fuller 
test (Table 3.1). Also, I can reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% level based on the 
Johansen cointegration test (Table 3.2).  
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
Figure 3.4 depicts the time path of the decomposed oil price shocks implied by the 
VAR model. As indicated by the plots, at any giving point in time, fluctuations in the real 
price of oil is driven by a multitude of shocks: shocks from the global crude oil production 
(oil supply shocks), shocks to global real economic activity (aggregate demand shocks), 
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and shocks driven by shifts in the precautionary demand for oil (precautionary demand 
shocks). The magnitude and time path of the decomposed shocks are consistent with 
Kilian (2009). Since I extended the data beyond 2007 which was the endpoint in Kilian 
(2009), I captured more recent shocks that occurred from 2008 to 2013. 
To test the assumption that the monthly shocks are serially and mutually 
uncorrelated, I applied the VAR test for serial correlation. Results in Table 3.3 confirm 
that the shocks are serially and mutually uncorrelated. Also, it is likely that the monthly 
shocks could exhibit seasonal patterns. For instance, global demand for commodities tend 
to increase during the last three months of the year even during periods of slowdown in 
global economic activity. If so, then it is necessary to seasonally adjust the shocks before 
estimating their impact on the system. Table 3.4 summarizes the test results for seasonal 
variations in structural shocks. As the results indicate, except for two months for aggregate 
demand shock, there is no evidence of significant seasonal variations in the monthly 
structural shocks. 
Figure 3.5 shows the impulse response pattern of real oil price to the supply and 
demand shocks in the global oil market based on the structural VAR model in Eq. (3.1). I 
normalized all shocks such that an innovation will tend to raise the price of oil. The plots 
show that fluctuations is the real price of oil originates from three distinct sources, that is, 
oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and precautionary demand shock. Consistent 
with Kilian (2009) and Peersman and Van Robays (2009), the study finds that an 
unexpected oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory increase in the real price of 
oil; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes a strong increase in the real 
price of oil; and an unanticipated increase in precautionary demand for oil triggers an 
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immediate and large increase in the real price of oil. 
Figure 3.6 shows the cumulative contribution of each shock to the real price of oil 
based on the historical decomposition of the data. As evident from the plots, oil supply 
shocks have historically made relatively small contributions to fluctuations in the real 
price of oil. Indeed, the largest contributions come from aggregate demand shocks and 
precautionary demand shocks. While aggregate demand shock is responsible for longer 
swings in the real price of oil, precautionary demand shock is responsible for relatively 
sharp swings in the real price of oil. These results are in line with the findings in the oil 
shocks literature (Barsky & Kilian, 2004; Fattouh et al., 2013; Kilian & Murphy, 2014; 
Kilian, 2009; Knittel & Pindyck, 2013; Peersman, 2009). 
Adding to the oil shocks literature, the decomposition of the structural disturbance 
to the real price of oil provide new evidence that the increase in the real price of oil 
between 2009 and 2010 is driven in most part by aggregate demand shock despite the 
sluggish global economic activity post-2008 recession. However, the increase in the real 
price of oil from 2011 to 2013, is driven mainly by precautionary demand motives due to 
uncertainties about future oil supply shortfalls. Supply disturbances played a marginal role 
during these two periods. 
 
3.5 Robustness Checks 
The section examines whether the ordering of the variables used to identify the 
baseline VAR can affect the structural shocks results. In other words, are the results from 
the VAR model in Eq. (3.1) robust? While the use of the Cholesky decomposition to 
identify the structural shocks and their impact on the system is justified by the theory 
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postulated in the SVAR model, the data cannot show that since different ordering of the 
variables in the SVAR is likely to generate completely different results. As robustness 
checks, I considered alternative identifying restrictions. In particular, I estimated an 
alternative reduced-form errors et with reversed exclusion restrictions on A0−1 as follows: 
The reversed exclusion restrictions imply that oil supply shocks do not 
contemporaneous affect global real economic activity. Also, aggregate demand shocks do 
not contemporaneous affect the real price of oil. These restrictions suggest the following 
ordering of the variables in the SVAR: REA → PROD → ROP. 
Also, I estimated another alternative reduced-form errors et with no exclusion 
restrictions on A0−1 as follows: 
The no-exclusion restrictions imply that all the structural shocks 
have contemporaneous impact on all variables in the system. In other words, there 
is no particular ordering of the variables.
The results from both alternative specifications (as shown in Appendix A) are 
consistent with results from the Cholesky decomposition suggesting that the baseline 




In this chapter, I disentangled the underlying causes of oil price shocks using the 
structural VAR model of the global crude oil market. Empirical results from the model 
reveal that fluctuations in the real price of oil originate from three distinct sources, that is, 
an oil supply shock caused by disruptions in global oil production, an aggregate demand 
shock driven by global economic activity, and an oil-specific demand shock driven by 
precautionary motives. An unexpected oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory 
increase in the real price of oil; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes a 
strong increase in the real price of oil; and an unanticipated increase in precautionary 
demand for oil triggers an immediate and large increase in the real price of oil.  
In addition, the historical decompositions of the real price of oil show that oil 
supply shocks have historically made relatively small contributions to fluctuations in the 
real price of oil. The largest contributions come from aggregate demand shocks and 
precautionary demand shocks. While aggregate demand shock is responsible for longer 
swings in the real price of oil, precautionary demand shock is responsible for relatively 
sharp swings in the real price of oil.  
Finally, adding to the oil shocks literature, the decomposition of the structural 
disturbance to the real price of oil provide new evidence that the increase in the real price 
of oil between 2009 and 2010 is driven in most part by aggregate demand shock despite 
the sluggish global economic activity post-2008 recession. However, the increase in the 
real price of oil from 2011 to 2013, is driven mainly by precautionary demand motives 
due to uncertainties about future oil supply shortfalls. Supply disturbances played a 
marginal role during these two periods. Overall, the findings provide further evidence that 
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not all price shocks are the same; they originate from different sources and thus have 
different macroeconomic consequences. 
Figure 3.1 Data plot of global oil production and its transformation 
Figure 3.2 Data plot of real oil price and its transformation 















































































































































Table 3.1  
Unit root test  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test  
Null: series not stationary 
          Variable Test statistic 
Global oil production  -6.936*** (0.000) 
Real oil price  -4.322*** (0.000) 
Index of real global economic activity -2.842*** (0.000) 
Notes: Data on all oil-related variables are obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The 
oil price variable used is the nominal refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil, which is considered the best 
proxy for the global price of imported crude oil in the literature. The world economic activity indicator is proposed 
in Kilian (2009) and available on his research webpage. All the oil-related variables are expressed in detrended logs. 
Probabilities in parenthesis. For all the variables, we can reject the null hypothesis of the existence of unit root at 
the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 3.2  
Cointegration test  
Johansen Cointegration Test  
Null: no cointegration 




None * 15.494*** (0.000) 
At most 1 * 3.841*** (0.004) 
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Precautionary demand shock 
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Table 3.3 
VAR test for serial correlation in structural shocks 
Null: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Lag LM Test statistic 
Probabilities in parenthesis.     















































Notes: Test statistic based on Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals of VAR models.  
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Table 3.4 
VAR test for seasonal variations in structural shocks 























































































Figure 3.5 Response of real price of oil to supply and demand shocks 
 






Figure 3.6 Cumulative effect of oil demand and oil supply shocks on the real price 


































OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND OIL IMPORT DEMAND: A STRUCTURAL 
 VAR-PANEL ARDL APPROACH 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Oil import demand has been of particular interest in the energy-growth literature as 
it constitutes the principal channel for the transmission of energy shocks to the 
macroeconomy of energy-importing countries. A considerable amount of research has 
examined the demand for oil in general and raw crude or petroleum products in particular. 
Atkins and Jazayeri (2004) provide an excellent survey on earlier studies. Recent studies 
conducted in a time-series context include Cooper (2003) on the United States and 22 other 
countries; Altinay (2007) on Turkey; Gosh (2009) on India; Ziramba (2010) on South 
Africa; Sun, Qi, and Jia (2010) on China; Asali (2011) on Group of Seven (G7) countries 
and Brazil, Russia, India, and China (commonly termed as BRIC); and Kim and Baek 
(2013) on South Korea. Other studies conducted in pooled cross-section or panel context 
include Dargay and Gately (2010) for six groups of countries; International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 2011) for a panel of 45 OECD and non-OECD countries; and Javan and Zahran 
(2015) for a panel of 25 OECD and non-OECD countries that represent 75% of global oil 
demand. The elasticity estimates from these country-specific and panel studies vary 
substantially. Nonetheless, the overall empirical results point to one direction: oil import 
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demand is generally price and income inelastic in the short-run. 
A standard approach utilized by these studies is to model oil import demand as a 
function of the price of oil and income (GDP). One reason for this modeling approach is 
that fluctuations in the real price of oil is thought to originate from oil supply disturbances 
driven by events in the Middle East. Since these events are outside the confines of 
macroeconomic models, they are, together with oil price fluctuations, treated as exogenous. 
Another reason relates to the notion that oil import demand for any single country is not 
large enough to affect world oil prices; hence the price of oil is assumed to be exogenously 
determined. 
Recent research on oil shocks have challenged these long-held beliefs about the 
causes of oil price shocks and provided strong theoretical and empirical evidence that oil 
supply disruptions are not the only driver of fluctuations in the real price of oil, but other 
factors such as dynamics in global macroeconomic activity as well as concerns about future 
oil supply shortfalls also influence the real price of oil (Alquist et al., 2013; Kilian & 
Murphy, 2012; Kilian, 2009; Kilian, 2014; Peersman, 2009). 
Since Kilian (2009), it has become evident that oil price shocks are driven by 
distinct supply and demand shocks: an oil supply shock caused by disruptions in global oil 
production (oil supply shocks), an aggregate demand shock driven by global economic 
activity (aggregate demand shocks), and an oil market specific demand shock driven by 
precautionary demand motives (precautionary demand shocks). Consequently, current 
research efforts have been directed towards the re-examination of the effects of these 
distinct oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables such as output and inflation, but none 
on oil import demand. 
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My goal in this chapter is to fill in the gap by building on the recent advances in the 
oil shocks literature to develop a two-step empirical framework to examine the effects of 
the three distinct oil price shocks on oil import demand. The analysis relies on more recent 
data (1980-2013) for a sample of 30 oil-importing countries. 
The central message of the chapter is that the standard approach to modeling oil 
import demand as a function of oil price and GDP is not well-defined because it implicitly 
assumes that one can vary the price of oil while holding all other variables fixed. This 
ceteris paribus assumption is not appropriate for two reasons.  
 First, the standard approach implies that oil import demand is endogenous while 
the price of oil and GDP are exogenous. But this is not the case since the price of oil and 
GDP are potentially endogenous and reverse causality may run from one to the other. 
Second, shocks to the global economic activity reflected in the demand for all 
industrial commodities may have direct effects on oil import demand as well as an 
indirect effect working through the price of oil. Thus, even if one controls for the reverse 
causality, these direct and indirect effects of global demand shocks on oil import 
demand invalidate the ceteris paribus assumption. 
I jointly address these issues by developing a two-step structural VAR-panel ARDL 
approach. More specifically, I used the structural VAR model proposed by Kilian (2009) 
to identify the underlying demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil market and 
decompose the real price of oil into three components: oil supply shocks, aggregate demand 
shocks, and precautionary demand shocks. I then estimate the sensitivity of oil import 
demand to the oil price shocks for a panel of 30 oil-importing countries from 1980-2013 
using the panel ARDL model. 
30 
 
Empirical results from the structural VAR model of the global crude oil market 
reveal that an unexpected oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory increase in the 
real price of oil; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes a strong increase in 
the real price of oil; and an unanticipated increase in precautionary demand for oil triggers 
an immediate and large increase in the real price of oil. As robustness checks, I estimate 
alternative specifications of the VAR by changing the order of the variables and find that 
the results are not sensitive to the ordering of the variables in the model. 
Empirical results from the panel ARDL model reveal that import demand for oil is 
less sensitive to oil price shocks driven by supply disturbances but highly sensitive to oil 
price shocks driven by aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks. Dividing the 
sample into OECD and non-OECD, I find that while OECD and non-OECD oil-importing 
countries are identical in their response to oil supply shocks, they differ in their responses 
to aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks. The elasticity estimates are robust 
to whether raw crude imports or petroleum products imports are used as measures of oil 
import demand. 
My principal contribution to the literature is that I model oil import demand as a 
function of the decomposed oil price shocks and provide new evidence that contrary to the 
standard modeling approach in existing literature, changes in the demand for imported oil 
do not depend on a single oil price shock but depend on multiple oil price shocks resulting 
from oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I lay out the two-step 
methodology utilized to disentangle the supply and demand shocks to the real price of oil 
and examine their respective impact on oil import demand. I describe the data in Section 
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4.3. In Section 4.4, I present and discuss the empirical results. I follow up with a discussion 
of the observed differential response of oil import demand across oil-importing countries 
in Section 4.5 leading to the conclusion in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
To examine the effects of oil price shocks on oil import demand, I develop a two-
step estimation procedure. First, I use the structural VAR model to disentangle the 
underlying demand and supply shocks to the real price of oil. Second, I used the panel 
ARDL model to estimate the degree of responsiveness – elasticities – of oil import demand 
to the shocks. 
 
4.2.1 The Structural VAR Model 
Following Kilian (2009), I define a structural VAR model of the global crude oil 
market as follows: 
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 A0zt = α+∑ Aizt−1 +εt (4.1) 
i=1 
where zt denotes a vector time series consisting of monthly global crude oil production 
(PRODt), an index of monthly global real economic activity (REAt), and the monthly real 
oil price (ROPt). The model allows for two years of lags. The sample period is January 
1980 to December 2013. The error term, εt, denotes the vector of serially and mutually 
uncorrelated structural innovations. A0−1 has a recursive structure such that the reduced-




This model postulates that the real price of oil is determined by the intersection of 
a vertical supply curve of oil and a downward sloping demand curve for oil. Oil supply 
shocks triggered by – say, a disruption in global oil supply – move the vertical supply curve 
along the demand curve causing the real price of oil to change. Oil demand shocks (driven 
by aggregate demand shocks or precautionary demand shocks) move the demand curve 
along the vertical supply curve, again causing the real price of oil to change. 
As in Kilian (2009), I impose the following restrictions on A0−1. First, I define oil 
supply shocks as unpredictable innovations to global oil production and assume that oil 
supply does not respond to innovations to the demand for oil within the same month. This 
exclusion is conceivable as in practice, oil-producing countries tend to be slow in their 
response to demand shocks due to increased adjustment costs of oil production and the 
uncertainty about the state of the crude oil market. Second, I define aggregate demand 
shocks as innovations to global real economic activity that cannot be explained based on 
oil supply shocks. I impose the exclusion restriction that increases in the real price of oil 
driven by shocks that are specific to the oil market will not lower global real economic 
activity immediately, but with a delay of at least one month, as it takes time for global real 
economic activity to adjust. This restriction captures the sluggish response of global real 
economic activity after major oil price increases. Finally, I attribute shifts in demand for 
oil that are not driven by changes in global real economic activity to oil-market specific 
events driven by fears concerning the availability of future oil supply shortfalls. I refer to 
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this shock as precautionary demand shock.4 
Since my main concern is to examine how each of the decomposed oil price shocks 
affect oil import (data on which are available only on annual basis for majority of the 
countries in the sample), I constructed annual shock series by averaging the monthly oil 
price shocks for each year as follows: 
 s,i,t, s = 1, 2, 3 (4.2) 
where ζˆs,t, s = 1,2,3 are the three decomposed oil price shocks and εˆs,i,t refers to the 
estimated residual for the sth oil price shock in the ith month of the tth year of the sample.5 
Figure 3.4 depicts time path of the annualized oil price shocks implied by the model. As 
indicated by the plots, at any giving point in time, fluctuations in the real price of oil is 
driven by a multitude of shocks: shocks from the global crude oil production (oil supply 
shock), shocks to the global demand for all industrial commodities including oil (aggregate 
demand), and shocks driven by shifts in precautionary demand for oil (precautionary 
demand shocks). 
One approach to estimating the elasticities of oil import demand to the 
decomposed shocks is to use a distributed lag regression model of the following form: 
5 
                                                 
4 The justification for labelling the latter shocks as precautionary demand shock is provided in Chapter 3. 
5 I used simple averaging of the monthly shocks to generate the annualized shocks. As robustness checks, I applied 
alternative frequency conversion methods for converting data from high frequency (monthly) to low frequency (yearly). 
The elasticity estimates from the alternative frequency conversions remain largely consistent with the elasticity estimates 
from the baseline model that uses simple averaging. The alternative frequency conversation methods include sum 
observations that set the low observation equal to the sum of the observations in the corresponding high observations, 
that is, take the sum of say Jan. 2009, Feb. 2009,..., Dec. 2009 and put them into Y2009; first observation that sets the 
low observation equal to the value in the first of the corresponding high observations, that is, take the value of Jan. 2009 
and put it into Y2009; last observation that sets the low observation equal to the value in the last of the corresponding 
high observations, that is, take the value of Dec. 2009 and put it into Y2009; max observation that sets the low observation 
equal to the maximum of the corresponding high observations, that is, take the maximum of Jan. 2009, Feb. 2009,..., Dec. 
2009 and put it into Y2009; and min observation that sets the low observation equal to the minimum of the corresponding 
high observations, that is, take the minimum of Jan. 2009, Feb. 2009,..., Dec 2009 and put it into Y2009. 
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 Mt = αs +ψs,i ∑ζˆs,t−i +es,t, s = 1, 2, 3 (4.3) 
i=1 
where Mt, denotes oil import demand; ψs,i are the impulse response coefficients which 
corresponds to horizon i; ζˆs are the three serially uncorrelated oil price shocks; and es,t are 
potentially serially correlated errors. 
Kilian et al. (2009) utilized this distributed lag regression model on an equation-
by-equation basis to examine the effects of oil shocks on external balances for individual 
and groups of countries. Though dynamic, the distributed lag equation-by-equation 
approach is less parsimonious especially if the study is dealing with a large set of countries. 
In addition, the equation-by-equation approach does not fully incorporate the sample 
dynamics since each country or group is modelled separately. 
Thus, the study employs the panel ARDL approach to cointegration which takes the 
sample dynamics into account by using the lags of the dependent variable and the lagged 
and contemporaneous values of the explanatory variable(s) to estimate a single equation 
that concurrently provides elasticity estimates at the panel level as well as the country-
specific level. An added advantage of the panel ARDL model is that it can be applied 
irrespective of whether the underlying variables in the model are purely I(0) or purely I(1) 
or partially integrated (Altinay, 2007; Pesaran, Shin, & Smith, 1999; von Arnim & 
Prabheesh, 2013). 
 
4.2.2 The Panel ARDL Model 
The panel ARDL model was developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). To 
estimate the elasticities of oil import demand to the decomposed structural shocks, I 
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constructed the following panel ARDL(p,q) model: 
 p q 
Mi,t = ∑λi,jMi,t−j + ∑ψi,jζˆs,t−j +µi +ei,t  p = 1; q = 5   (4.4)  
j=1  j=0  
 
where i = 1, 2,.., N; t = 1, 2,.., T; Mi,t denotes oil import demand; ζˆs,t, s = 1,2,3 are the three 
decomposed oil price shocks; µi is the fixed effects; ei,t is the error term and are 
independently distributed across i and t with means 0 and variance σi2 > 0; the coefficients 
of the lagged dependent variable, λi,j, are scalars; ψi,j are k x 1 coefficient vectors of the oil 
price shocks. 
Reparameterizing Eq. (4.4) yields the following error correction model to be 
estimated: 
 p−1 q−1 
 ∆Mi,t = φi(Mit−1 −βiζˆs,t−1)+ ∑ λi,j∆Mi,t−j + ∑ ψi,j∆ζˆs,t−j +ei,t      p = 1; q = 5 (4.5) 
 j=1 j=0 
where φi is the error-correction speed of adjustment parameter; (Mi,t−1 - βiζˆs,t−1) represents 
the long-run component of the model; and ψi,j are k x 1 vector of short-run elasticities of 
oil import demand to the three decomposed oil price shocks. The parameter q is chosen to 
coincide with the maximum horizon of the short-run price elasticities to be estimated. As 
standard in the literature for short-run analysis, the maximum horizon is set to five years. 
To capture the time path of the short-run response to the decomposed oil price 
shocks, I did not sum the short-run price elasticities across the five years worth of lags. 
Rather, I presented the elasticities for each period as estimated by the model. Also, I 
included a time trend in Eq. (4.5) to account for trends in oil import demand. 
Of primary interest in Eq. (4.5) are the error-correction speed of adjustment 
parameter, φi, the long-run oil price elasticity coefficients, βi, and the short-run oil price 
elasticity coefficients, ψi,j. Theoretically, φi is expected to be negative if the variables 
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exhibit a return to long-run equilibrium. For an adverse oil supply shock, the long-run price 
elasticities of oil import demand, βi, and short-run price elasticities of oil import demand, 
ψi,j, are expected to be negative and the absolute value < 1 (inelastic). For demand shocks 
(positive aggregate demand shock and adverse precautionary demand shock), the long-run 
price elasticities of oil import demand, βi, and short-run price elasticities, ψi,j, are expected 
to be positive. 
 
4.3 Data 
The global oil market variables in the structural VAR model include world oil 
production, global real economic activity, and real oil price. All the variables are in 
monthly series and covers the sample period from January 1980 to December 2013. Oil 
production and price data are obtained from the United States EIA. The oil price is the 
nominal refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil deflated by the United States GDP 
deflator, which is considered to be the best proxy for global price of oil in the literature. 
The global economic activity indicator is proposed in Kilian (2009) and is available on his 
research webpage. All the oil market variables are expressed in detrended logs. The plots 
of the data series are shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.3. For all the variables, I can reject the null 
hypothesis of the existence of unit root at the 10% level using the Augmented Dicky-Fuller 
test (Table 3.1). Also, I can reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% level based on the 
Johansen cointegration test (Table 3.2). 
The primary data source for the oil demand variable is the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) Energy Balances database. Annual volume of raw crude (import and export) 
and petroleum products (import and export) in million tons of oil equivalent was taken 
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from the IEA database for a sample of 30 oil-importing countries from 1980-2013. A 
country is classified as an oil importer if its average volume of raw crude exports is less 
than 15% of its average volume of raw crude imports during 1980-2013 period. Table 4.1 
contains the list of countries included the sample. 
 To control for the size of the oil importing countries, I constructed the oil demand 
variable as follows. I converted the annual oil import data from million tons of oil 
equivalent (mtoe) to million barrels of oil per year (mbpy) based on Brent crude conversion 
factor of 1 metric ton (mt) of oil equivalent equals 7.57 barrels of oil. I then multiplied the 
resultant volume of oil import, in mbpy, by the nominal crude oil price and expressed it as 
a share of GDP. The baseline panel ARDL model uses this measure of oil import demand 
as the dependent variable. However, the results are robust whether raw crude import or 
petroleum products (expressed as shares of GDP) are used as the dependent variable.6 
Since the oil demand variables are for a panel of countries, panel unit root tests 
were applied to examine stationarity. The choice of panel unit root test however depends 
on whether the sample data is cross-sectional dependent or independent. If the sample is 
cross-sectionally dependent, the appropriate panel unit root test is the Pesaran (2007) CIPS 
test but if the sample is cross-sectionally independent, the appropriate panel unit root is 
Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) LLC test and Phillips and Perron (1988) PP test. Table 4.2 
reports the results from the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) test on oil 
import demand. The results indicate that the null hypothesis of cross-sectional 
                                                 
6 I excluded China from the baseline panel ARDL model because China was a net oil-exporter from 1980-1992 before 
it became a net oil-importer in 1993 and thereafter. In addition, its average oil export as a share of average oil import 
from 1980-2013 is 20% (which is above the 15% threshold and more than twice the highest in the sample). I however 
estimated a separate model for China and the elasticity estimates generally exhibits similar patterns like most oil-
importing countries in the sample. Oil import is strongly responsive to demand-driven oil price shocks but mildly 
responds to supply-driven oil price shocks. 
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independence can be rejected at the 5% level. Thus, I applied the Peseran (2007) panel unit 
root CIPs test to examine the stationarity of the oil import demand variable. Results in 
Table 4.3 indicate that oil demand variables are stationary. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Decomposed Oil Price Shocks 
Figure 4.1 shows the impulse response pattern of real oil price to the supply and 
demand shocks in the global oil market based on the structural VAR model in Eq. (4.1). 
The plots show that fluctuations in the real price of oil originate from different sources: oil 
supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and precautionary demand shock. Consistent with 
Kilian (2009) and Peersman and Van Robays (2009), the study finds that an unexpected 
oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory increase in the real price of oil; an 
unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes a strong increase in the real price of oil; 
and an unanticipated increase in precautionary demand for oil triggers an immediate and 
large increase in the real price of oil. 
Figure 4.2 shows the historical decompositions of the real price of oil. As evident 
from the plots, oil supply shocks have historically made relatively small contributions to 
fluctuations in the real price of oil. Indeed, the largest contributions come from aggregate 
demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks. While aggregate demand shock is 
responsible for longer swings in the real price of oil, precautionary demand shock is 
responsible for relatively sharp swings in the real price of oil. These results are consistent 
with the findings in the oil shocks literature (Barsky & Kilian, 2004; Fattouh et al., 2013; 
Kilian & Murphy, 2014; Kilian, 2009; Knittel & Pindyck, 2013; Peersman, 2009). 
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4.4.2 Effects of Decomposed Oil Price Shocks on Oil Import Demand 
Before estimating the panel ARDL model, a necessary step is to test for 
cointegration among the underlying variables to determine the existence or absence of a 
long-run relationship. This requirement ensures that the ARDL model reaches a long-run 
stable equilibrium. To test for cointegration, I applied three standard panel cointegration 
tests (Fisher-Johansen, 1988; Kao, Chiang, & Chen 1999; Pedroni, 1999). The results in 
Table 4.4 indicate that oil import demand and the oil shocks are cointegrated based on at 
least two of three panel cointegration tests. Having established the cointegration 
relationship among oil import demand and the oil shocks, I estimated the long-run and 
short-run elasticities of the ARDL model in Eq. (4.5). 
Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 report the panel results for oil import demand response to 
each of the decomposed oil price shocks. The long-run price elasticities of oil import 
demand are reported in the first part of each table while the short-run dynamics are reported 
in the second part. The elasticity estimates represent the degree of responsiveness to a 10% 
structural innovation in each of the decomposed oil price shocks. 
As expected, the error-correction speed of adjustment parameter, φi, is negative and 
significant in all estimated models, confirming that the underlying variables in the model 
exhibit a return to long-run equilibrium. Also, as expected, the panel long-run price 
elasticities of oil import demand, βi, are negative and inelastic in response to an adverse 
oil supply shock although not statistically significant (Table 4.5). For a positive aggregate 
demand shock and precautionary demand shock, the long-run price elasticities of import 
demand have the theoretically unexpected signs and are not statistically significant (Tables 
4.6 and 4.7). 
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Figure 4.3 plots the panel short-run elasticities of raw crude, petroleum products, 
and oil (crude plus petroleum) import demand to the three decomposed oil shocks from 
Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. All the short-run elasticity estimates (with few exceptions in 
Models 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7) are statistically significant at the 5% level. For a 10% structural 
innovation in each of the three distinct oil price shocks and a maximum elasticities horizon 
of five years, the elasticity estimates at the panel level reveal the following results. In 
response to an adverse oil supply shock, the price elasticity of oil import demand is negative 
and price inelastic. This suggests that, an adverse oil supply shock results in a less than 
proportionate decrease in oil import on impact but the decrease is transitory as the elasticity 
turns positive after the second year. After a positive aggregate demand shock, the price 
elasticity of oil import demand is positive and price inelastic implying that, a positive 
aggregate demand shock results in a relatively strong persistent increase in oil import with 
about a year delay. The increase in imports peaks about the third year and begins to decline 
afterwards. Finally, precautionary demand for oil driven by concerns about the availability 
of future oil supply triggers a sharp increase in oil import demand in the first year, followed 
by a decline thereafter as concerns about future oil supply shortfalls ease. These results are 
identical for raw crude and petroleum products import demand. 
The assumption that the oil price shocks ζˆs,t, s = 1, 2, 3 are exogenous is tested 
using the Hausman-Durbin-Wu regressor endogeneity test. Exogeneity here means 
predeterminess of the oil price shocks, that is, the oil price shocks are determined outside 
the panel ARDL model. Table 4.8 reports the results which confirms the exogeneity of the 
shocks across all countries in the sample. 
The country-level short-run elasticity estimates of the various measures of oil 
41 
import demand to the decomposed oil price shocks are summarized in Appendix B. All the 
short-run elasticities are statistically significant at the 5% level. Given the large degree of 
heterogeneity across oil-importing countries, Figures 4.4 to 4.9 compare the results from 3 
OECD and 3 non-OECD countries.7  Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 plot the short-run elasticities 
for 3 OECD oil-importing countries (United States, Germany, and the Netherlands) and 
Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 plot the short-run elasticities for 3 non-OECD oil-importing 
countries (Bangladesh, Kenya, and El Salvador).8 
Regarding OECD oil-importers, plots in Figure 4.4 (United States), Figure 4.5 
(Germany), and Figure 4.6 (the Netherlands) show that an unanticipated oil supply 
disruption causes a small transitory decrease in oil import demand (negative and price 
inelastic) in the United States and Germany but does not have an immediate impact on oil 
import demand in the Netherlands as the price elasticity is zero in the first year and turns 
positive from about the second year. A positive aggregate demand shock results in a strong 
and persistent increase in oil import with about a year’s delay (positive but price inelastic) 
across the OECD countries. Precautionary demand for oil triggers an immediate increase 
demand for imported oil in all the 3 countries. However, it appears that the Netherlands’ 
immediate response to precautionary demand for imported oil is stronger relative to United 
States and Germany. 
Turning now to non-OECD oil-importing economies, plots in Figure 4.7 
(Bangladesh), Figure 4.8 (Kenya), and Figure 4.9 (El Salvador) indicate that Kenya is more 
sensitive to adverse oil supply shocks in their demand for imported oil (negative and 
7 The country classification is based on World Bank GNI per capita from 1980-2013. Alternative classifications based on World Bank 
PPP GNI per capita and PPP GDP per capita (data on which is available from 1990-2013) yielded similar country categorization. 
8 Plots for the remaining 24 oil-importing countries in the sample are available but not reported due to space constraints. 
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persistently price inelastic), while Bangladesh and El Salvador are less sensitive to adverse 
oil supply shocks in their demand for imported oil (literally zero price elasticity for most 
part of the five-year horizon). A positive aggregate demand shock results in a strong 
increase in oil import in El Salvador than in Kenya and Bangladesh. Among the 3 non-
OECD oil-importing economies, demand for imported oil is more responsive to 
precautionary demand shocks in El Salvador and Kenya than in Bangladesh. 
Comparing OECD and non-OECD oil-importing countries, their responses to oil 
supply shocks are found to be identical. For instance, demand for imported oil in 
Bangladesh, like in the United States and Germany, is not sensitive to adverse oil supply 
shocks in the first year immediately after the shock. Also, oil import demand in El Salvador 
exhibits similar pattern to the Netherlands. In both countries, oil import demand decreases 
marginally in the first year following an adverse oil supply shock but increases from about 
the second year. Since OECD oil-importing countries with advanced financial systems tend 
to be less financially constrained, and hence, less sensitive to supply-driven oil price 
shocks, the identical response by OECD and non-OECD countries could reflect the role of 
oil consumption subsidies in non-OECD countries (Bangladesh and El Salvador) to help 
absorb the adverse oil supply shocks.9 
In contrast to the identical response to supply-driven oil price shocks, the response 
to demand-driven oil price shocks, especially in the case of aggregate demand shocks, 
differs between OECD and non-OECD. Among OECD countries, the largest response to 
aggregate demand comes from the Netherlands (with price elasticity of 0.22 in the first 
year following the shock) while among non-OECD countries, the largest response is from 
9 According to IEA estimates for 2012, oil subsidies amounted to $100 million in El Salvador and $900 million in Bangladesh (IEA 
World Energy Outlook, 2015). 
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Kenya (with price elasticity of 0.15 three years following the shock). As summarized in 
Appendix B, the observed differences across the 3 OECD and 3 non-OECD oil-
importing countries highlighted in this section are representative of the remaining 24 
countries (OECD and non-OECD) in the sample. 
4.5 Discussion 
The observed differential response of oil import demand to the three distinct oil 
price shocks between OECD and non-OECD oil-importing countries could reflect cross-
country heterogeneity driven by factors such as the size of manufacturing sector, refinery 
capacity, oil consumption subsidies, and financial constraint variables. For example, 
demand for imported oil in countries with relatively large manufacturing sector may be 
less responsive to supply-driven oil price shocks but highly responsive to aggregate 
demand-driven oil price shocks. Similarly, oil-importers with relatively large refinery 
capacity may be less responsive to supply-driven price shocks but respond strongly to 
aggregate demand-driven price shocks.  
In addition, oil-importing countries with oil consumption subsidies may not 
significantly decrease their demand for imported oil following a supply-driven shock. In 
the case of demand-driven shocks, the effect of oil consumption subsidies on oil import 
demand could also depend on the size of manufacturing sector and the combination of these 
two factors can lead to completely different responses to oil price shocks even among oil-
importing countries with significant oil consumption subsidies.  
Finally, oil-importers with relatively large net foreign asset positions (less 
financially constrained) may be resilient to supply-driven price shocks and respond 
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strongly to aggregate demand-driven price shocks. 
The two-step structural VAR-panel ARDL approach proposed in this chapter 
cannot separate out the potential influence of these cross-country heterogeneity factors on 
oil import demand response to the decomposed oil price shocks. However, the evidence I 
have presented here based on the two-step approach points to a clear story. Oil import 
demand does not depend on a single oil price shock but depends on multiple oil price 
shocks resulting from oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and precautionary 
demand shocks. Supply-driven oil price shocks cause mild transitory decrease in oil import 
demand. Demand-driven oil price shocks (aggregate demand and precautionary demand 
shocks) trigger strong increases in oil import demand. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I disentangle the underlying causes of oil price shocks and estimate 
their impact on oil import demand for a sample of 30 oil-importing countries. The central 
message of the chapter has been that the standard approach to modeling oil import demand 
as a function of oil price and GDP is not well-defined because it implicitly assumes that 
fluctuations in the real price of oil is exogenous to oil-importing countries.  
Using the structural VAR model of the global oil market, I endogenize the real price 
of oil and decompose oil price shocks into three distinct components: oil supply shocks, 
aggregate demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks. I then model oil import 
demand as a function of the shocks and provide the short-run oil import demand elasticity 
estimates to each shock as well as the time path of the elasticities for a sample of 30 oil-
importing countries using panel ARDL model. 
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Empirical results from the structural VAR model of the global crude oil market 
reveal that an unexpected oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory increase in the 
real price of oil; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes a strong increase in 
the real price of oil; and an unanticipated increase in precautionary demand for oil triggers 
an immediate and large increase in the real price of oil. Empirical results from the panel 
ARDL model show that import demand for oil is less sensitive to oil price shocks driven 
by supply disturbances but highly sensitive to oil price shocks driven by aggregate demand 
and precautionary demand shocks. Dividing the sample into OECD and non-OECD, I find 
that while OECD and non-OECD oil-importing countries are identical in their response to 
oil supply shocks, they differ in their response to aggregate demand and precautionary 
demand shocks. 
My main contribution to the literature is that I model oil import demand as a 
function of the decomposed oil price shocks and provide new evidence that contrary to the 
standard modeling approach in existing literature, changes in the demand for imported oil 
do not depend on a single oil price shock but depend on multiple oil price shocks resulting 
from oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks. 
Supply-driven oil price shocks cause mild transitory decrease in oil import demand. 
Demand-driven oil price shocks (aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks) 




































Table 4.2  
Cross-section dependence test 
Pesaran (2004) CD Test 
Null: cross-section independence 
Variable Test statistic p-value 
CRUDE IMP DD 88.33*** 0.000 
0.000 PETRO IMP DD 66.69*** 
OIL IMP DD 96.42*** 0.000 
Notes: CRUDE IMP DD = Crude import bill as share of GDP. PETRO IMP DD = Petroleum products 
import bill as share of GDP. OIL IMP DD = Oil (crude plus petroleum products) import bill as share of 
GDP.  p-values: *** denotes 1% level of significance, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
 
 
Table 4.3  
Panel unit root test with cross-sectional dependence 
Pesaran (2007) CIPS Test 
Null: series not stationary  
Variable Test statistic p-value 
Crude import   -5.773***   0.000 
Petroleum import -4.295*** 0.000 
Oil import  -5.336*** 0.000 
Notes: CRUDE IMP DD = Crude import bill as share of GDP. PETRO IMP DD = Petroleum products 
import bill as share of GDP. OIL IMP DD = Oil (crude plus petroleum products) import bill as share of 










Figure 4.1 Response of real price of oil to supply and demand shocks 




































Table 4.4  




 ADF Kao  
ADF 
Oil supply shock 


















Aggregate demand shock 


















Precautionary demand shock 


















Notes: Fisher statistic, Pedroni ADF, and Kao ADF null hypotheses: no cointegration. p-values in parenthesis: *** 









Table 4.5  
Elasticities of respective fuel import demand to oil supply shock (panel) 
ARDL(1,5) 
Dynamic regressors (5 lags, fixed): OIL_SS_SHOCK  













Δ(OIL IMP DD) 
Long-run Equation 





























































2.092 2.053 2.074 
Notes: Elasticity estimates based on ARDL model with robust standard errors. p-values in parenthesis: *** 
denotes 1% level of significance, ** 5%, and * 10%. Durbin-Watson statistic: no serial autocorrelation if test 






Table 4.6  
Elasticities of respective fuel import demand to aggregate demand shock (panel) 
ARDL(1,5) 
Dynamic regressors (5 lags, fixed): AGG_DD_SHOCK 













Δ(OIL IMP DD) 
Long-run Equation 

























































Durbin-Watson statistic 2.030 2.006 1.994 
Notes: Elasticity estimates based on ARDL model with robust standard errors. p-values in parenthesis: *** 
denotes 1% level of significance, ** 5%, and * 10%. Durbin-Watson statistic: no serial autocorrelation if test 









Table 4.7  
Elasticities of respective fuel import demand to precautionary demand shock (panel) 
ARDL(1,5) 
Dynamic regressors (5 lags, fixed): PREC_DD_SHOCK 













Δ(OIL IMP DD) 
Long-run Equation 

























































Durbin-Watson statistic 2.220 2.128 2.199 
Notes: Elasticity estimates based on ARDL model with robust standard errors. p-values in parenthesis: *** 
denotes 1% level of significance, ** 5%, and * 10%. Durbin-Watson statistic: no serial autocorrelation if test 



































Table 4.8  
Hausman-Durbin–Wu regressor endogeneity test 














































MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS: EVIDENCE  
FROM OECD OIL-IMPORTING COUNTRIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, a growing number of studies have been examining 
the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks on oil-importing countries. These studies 
generally find that oil price shocks are inflationary and reduce the rhythm of economic 
activity. In this chapter, I also examine the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks. 
However, I depart from existing literature in two key respects. First, I compare the 
macroeconomic consequences of several types of oil price shocks exclusively for OECD 
oil-importing countries that constitute 41% of global oil demand. More specifically, I used 
a structural VAR model to distinguish between three different types of oil price shocks and 
estimate the effects of the shocks on inflation and output for 14 OECD oil-importing 
countries. Second, I evaluate whether structural differences matter for the impact of oil 
price shocks across countries, focusing on the role of oil intensity defined as the share of 
oil consumption in total energy consumption. 
My decomposition of the structural disturbances in the global oil market show that 
fluctuations in the price of oil are driven by three distinct shocks, that is, an oil supply 
shock caused by disruptions in global oil production, an aggregate demand shock driven 
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by global economic activity, and an oil-specific demand shock driven by precautionary 
demand motives. While each shock is associated with an increase in the price of oil, the 
macroeconomic effects of the shocks on oil-importing OECD countries crucially depend 
on the source of the shift: increases in the price of oil driven by oil supply shocks and 
precautionary demand shocks are inflationary and unfavorable to economic growth while 
increases in the price of oil driven by aggregate demand shocks are inflationary and 
favorable to economic growth.  
Regarding the role of oil intensity, I find that, after an unfavorable oil supply shock, 
low oil-intensive OECD countries typically face modest inflationary pressures, whereas 
the inflationary pressures are strong and persistent in high oil-intensive OECD countries. 
The recessionary effects are also lower in the former group. In contrast to the differential 
effects of oil supply shocks, the effects of oil demand shocks driven by global economic 
activity and precautionary demand motives turn out to be very similar across the two 
groups. When the oil price shock is caused by increased global economic activity or a rise 
in precautionary demand, both groups experience respectively a temporary increase and 
transitory decline in real economic output. The inflationary effects of the demand shocks 
are strong and identical for both groups. These findings suggest that oil-intensity can 
explain the differences in the effects of oil supply shocks across oil-importing OECD 
countries but it cannot explain the difference in the effects of oil demand shocks. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes the literature 
on the causes and macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks. Section 5.3 lays out the 
empirical methodology and describes the data. Results are presented and discussed in 
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
Reflecting the preoccupation of many economists with the 1970s oil crises, much 
of the literature on the causes and transmission of oil price shocks focused on models with 
exogenous oil price shocks. These studies emphasized that historical oil price shocks are 
the result of oil supply disruptions caused by military conflicts in the Middle East or 
changes in the production quotas set by oil-exporting countries (see Bruno & Sachs, 1982; 
Burbige & Harrison, 1984; Hamilton, 1983, 2003; Malinvaud, 1977; among others).10 
However, after a closer examination of the seemingly identical political events in 
the Middle East and other major oil producing regions, many observers began to cast doubt 
on the oil supply shock view and shifted their attention to the demand side. Barsky and 
Kilian (2002) was first to identify demand shocks as major determinants of movements in 
the price of oil and Kilian (2009) decomposed the underlying shocks to the price of oil into 
three components: shocks caused by disruptions in global oil supply (oil supply shocks); 
shocks to global economic activity (aggregate demand shocks); and shocks specific to the 
oil market driven by precautionary demand motives (oil-specific demand shocks). His 
decomposition provided compelling evidence that demand-driven oil price increases tend 
to be stronger and persistent whereas supply-driven oil price increases tend to be milder 
and transitory. 
Building on Kilian’s novel approach, researchers begun to explore the underlying 
causes of oil price shocks. Peersman and Van Robays (2009), Peersman and Van Robays 
(2012), and Kilian and Murphy (2014); all concluded that demand conditions collectively 
                                                 
10 Other studies with exogenous oil price shocks include Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), Bohi (1989), Cologni and Manera (2008), Cuado 
and Pres de Gracia (2003), Daniel (1997), Dogrul and Soytas (2010), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Jimnez-Rodrguez and Snchez (2005), 
Kilian (2007), Kim and Loungani (1992), Lardic and Mignon (2008), Leduc and Sill (2004), Mork et al. (1994), Raymond and Rich 
(1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), and Santini (1985). 
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explain major oil price shocks since 1973 and especially in more recent decades. The idea 
that demand shocks can explain major oil price fluctuations was initially met with 
skepticism but it is now commonly accepted that the role of global demand for oil is 
indispensable in understanding the causes of oil price shocks. Consequently, the prevailing 
conventional view is that oil price shocks are driven by exogenous oil supply shocks as 
well as endogenous demand conditions due to changes in global economic activity and 
precautionary demand for oil. 
Production disturbances in oil-producing countries can be considered as adverse oil 
supply shocks and hence result in a decline in oil production, rising oil prices, increased 
inflationary pressures, and depressed global economic activity. The opposite effect of 
adverse oil supply shocks on inflation and output is well-documented in the literature (see 
Kilian, 2014 for a survey on earlier studies). Recent studies such as Cashin, Mohaddes, 
Raissi, and Raissi (2012) find that, adverse oil supply shocks trigger strong inflationary 
pressures on major energy-importing countries (Euro Area, Japan, China, and the United 
States). Another study by Peersman and Van Robays (2012) find that a negative oil supply 
shock results in a permanent fall in economic activity across a set of industrialized 
countries. This opposite impact of supply-driven oil price disturbances on inflation and 
output tend to complicate appropriate monetary policy reaction as monetary authorities in 
oil-importing countries are continuously confronted with a trade-off between price stability 
and output stabilization. 
Alternatively, spikes in oil price could be caused by increased demand for oil. In 
this case, monetary authorities are also confronted with inflationary pressures but the 
output situation can be very different. In particular, in the event of increased global 
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economic activity, oil-importing countries could themselves be in a boom, or because they 
indirectly gain from trade with the rest of the world. This differential impact of demand-
driven oil price shocks on inflation and output is echoed by Baumeister & Peersman (2010), 
Cashin et al. (2012), Kilian (2009), and Peersman and Van Robays (2012). Even if the oil 
price shock is purely driven by speculations in the oil futures market, as Peersman and Van 
Robays (2012) and Arezki and Hasanov, (2013) argued, part of the petrodollars to oil-
producing countries can be recycled through increased trade, thereby reducing the negative 
impact on output. Consequently, monetary authorities are not necessarily confronted with 
a trade-off between price stability and output stabilization. 
Yet again, increases in the price of oil could be driven by precautionary demand for 
oil due to fears concerning future oil supply shortfalls. This shock is found to be associated 
with inflationary pressures and output decline. Kilian (2009) and Ansuini and Pisani (2015) 
concluded that shocks to precautionary oil demand almost completely explain the US 
recession of the early 1990s and contributed significantly to the recession in the early 2000s 
although during the most recent slump their contribution was more muted. Peersman and 
Van Robays (2009) found similar results for the Euro Area. Like supply-driven oil price 
shocks, the opposite effect of precautionary demand shocks on inflation and output 
complicates appropriate monetary policy response. 
In summary, the oil shocks literature suggests that fluctuations in the price of oil 
originate from distinct supply and demand shocks and that not only are the source and 
magnitude of the shocks relevant to policymakers, but also the time-path and the exact 
pass-through to inflation and economic activity are important. Thus, in this study, I build 
on the recent advances in the literature to distinguish between supply-driven and demand-
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driven oil price shocks and examine their macroeconomic effects on output and inflation 
exclusively for oil-importing OECD countries. 
 
5.3 Methodology and Data 
To disentangle the oil price shocks and examine their macroeconomic effects on 
output and inflation, I follow Peersman and Van Robays (2012) and consider a VAR model 
with the following general specification: 
        (5.1) 
The vector of variables included in the VAR are divided into two groups. The first 
group, Xt, captures the supply and demand conditions in the global oil market and includes 
world oil production (Qoil), real oil price (Poil), and a measure of global real economic 
activity (Yw). The second group of variables, Yj,t, is oil-importing OECD specific and 
contains real GDP (Yj) and inflation (Pj). α is a matrix of constants and linear trends; A(L) 
is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; B is the contemporaneous impact matrix of 
the vector of orthogonalized error terms εXt and εYj,t; εXt captures the structural shocks in the 
oil market; and εYj,t captures the shocks specific to OECD oil-importers. 
I distinguish between three different types of shocks in the oil market block, that is, 
an oil supply shock caused by disruptions in global crude oil production, an aggregate 
demand shock driven by global real economic activity, and an oil-specific demand shock 
driven by precautionary motives. To identify the structural disturbances, I impose sign 
restrictions on the estimated impulse responses of oil market variables in Xt. I assume that 
contemporaneous fluctuations in oil production, global economic activity, and oil prices 
are only driven by the three different types of shocks in εXt which corresponds to restricting 
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the B matrix to be block lower triangular. 
To disentangle the three oil shocks, I apply the following sign restrictions in Table 
5.1. The sign restrictions are derived from a simple supply-demand scheme. First, an oil 
supply shock is an exogenous shift of the oil supply curve, and therefore moves oil price 
and oil production in opposite directions. Following an unfavorable oil supply shock, 
global economic activity will not increase. 
Second, shocks to the demand side of the oil market will result in a shift of oil 
production and oil prices in the same direction, as demand-driven increases in oil prices 
are typically accommodated by increasing oil production in oil-exporting countries. I refer 
to such a shock as an aggregate demand shock. Accordingly, this shock is characterized by 
a positive co-movement between global real economic activity, oil prices, and oil 
production. 
Finally, I attribute shifts in demand for oil that are not driven by changes in global 
real economic activity to oil market specific events driven by fears concerning the 
availability of future oil supply and label this shock as precautionary demand shock. In 
contrast to aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand shocks will not have a positive 
effect on global economic activity. In fact, the final impact of precautionary demand on 
global economic activity could even be negative due to the associated oil price increase. 
Thus, I imposed the sign conditions to hold the first four quarters after the shocks to allow 
for sluggish responses. These sign restrictions on the global oil market uniquely identify 
the three oil shocks. Since the oil-importing OECD variables are not constrained in the 
estimations, the direction and magnitude of these responses are determined by the data. 
Also, I do not further identify the oil-importing OECD specific shocks in εYt since only the 
68 
oil shocks are of interest. 
The VAR model was estimated using quarterly data from the first quarter of 1980 
to the fourth quarter of 2013. The oil market variables, oil production, global real economic 
activity, and real oil price are expressed in detrended logs. Inflation and real GDP are 
expressed in percent changes. The list of countries and summary statistics are reported in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. For all variables, I reject the null hypothesis of the 
existence of unit root at the 10% level using Augmented Dicky-Fuller test (Table 5.4). 
Also, I reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% level based on the Johansen 
cointegration test (Table 5.5). Per the standard lag selection criteria results in Table 5.6, I 
included two lags of the endogenous variables in the model. The results are, however, 
robust to different choices of lag length (see Appendix C). 
Since I allow for feedback from the country-specific variables to the variables of 
the oil market in the VAR model, the magnitude and the dynamics of the identified oil 
price shocks could differ depending on the country included in Yj,t, which could impair the 
comparability of the cross-country effects. To check the significance of this feedback 
factor, I imposed strict exogeniety between the oil market and country variables by 
estimating a near-VAR model and find that the feedback factor is insignificant. 11 Thus, the 
results reported in this chapter are not affected by the feedback factor and cross-country 
comparisons can be made simply by normalizing the oil shocks from the structural VAR 
in Eq. (5.1) to a 10% oil price increase. 
Data on all oil-related variables are obtained from the U.S. EIA. The oil price 
variable used is the nominal refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil deflated by the 
11 Results from the near-VAR estimation is summarized in Appendix C. 
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US GDP deflator, which is considered to be the best proxy for global price of oil in the 
literature. The world economic activity indicator is proposed in Kilian (2009) and available 
on his research webpage. Inflation and real GDP data for the 14 OECD oil-importers are 
obtained from OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database. 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Decomposed Oil Price Shocks 
Figure 5.1 shows the impulse response pattern of real oil price to the supply and 
demand shocks in the global oil market. The plots show that fluctuations in the real price 
of oil originate from different sources: oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and 
precautionary demand shock. Consistent with Kilian (2009) and Peersman and Van Robays 
(2009), the study finds that an unexpected oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory 
increase in the real price of oil; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes a 
strong increase in the real price of oil; and an unanticipated increase in precautionary 
demand triggers an immediate and large increase in the real price of oil. 
My estimates from the structural VAR model provide further evidence that not all 
price shocks are the same; they originate from different sources, and thus their 
macroeconomic effects crucially depend on the source of the shock. 
 
5.4.2 Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the estimated impulse responses of inflation and real GDP 
growth to the three oil price shocks together with the standard error bands. The main results 
are the following. First, after a supply-driven oil price shock, oil-importing OECD 
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countries experience mild inflationary pressures as inflation rises modestly and remains 
slightly above its baseline for an extended period. Economic activity declines three quarters 
after the shock but the decline is transitory and not statistically significant. My finding 
regarding the mild inflationary pressures of oil supply shocks contrasts those of Cashin et 
al. (2012) who find strong inflationary pressures on major energy-importing countries 
(Euro Area, Japan, China, and the United States) for an adverse oil supply shock. With 
respect to economic activity, my finding also contrasts Peersman and Van Robays (2012), 
who show that a negative oil supply shock results in a permanent fall in economic activity 
of net oil-importing countries. 
The macroeconomic effects of an aggregate demand-driven oil-price shock is 
substantially different from those of an oil-supply disturbance. Following an aggregate 
demand shock, oil-importing OECD countries experience strong inflationary pressures and 
a short-run increase in economic activity. The short-run increase in real output following 
an aggregate demand shock is also echoed by Cashin et al. (2012) and Peersman and Van 
Robays (2012) and are not surprising given that the oil-price spike is assumed to be 
endogenously driven by a shift in global economic activity. Indeed, output can rise because 
the country itself is in a boom, or because the country indirectly gains from trade with the 
rest of the world. 
Finally, a precautionary demand shock triggers strong inflationary pressures and 
sharp decline in economic activity across the 14 oil-importing OECD countries. While the 
inflationary impact of precautionary demand shock is not persistent as it wears off four 
quarters after the shock, the recessionary impact is relatively persistent and wears off 
eighteen quarters after the shock. This finding is consistent with Kilian (2009) and Ansuini 
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and Pisani (2015), who find that shocks to precautionary oil demand almost completely 
explain the US recession of the early 1990s and contributed significantly to the recession 
in the early 2000s. 
Overall, my findings reveal that oil price shocks are inflationary and detrimental to 
economic growth if driven by oil supply shocks and precautionary demand shocks but 
inflationary and favorable to economic growth if driven by aggregate demand shocks. The 
postestimation diagnostic tests results shown in Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 confirm the 
absence of major diagnostic problems like serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and 
nonnormality. In addition, stability test results in Figure 5.4 indicates that the parameters 
in the models are stable over time. As robustness checks, I estimated alternative 
specifications of the structural VAR by changing the order of the variables and find that 
responses of economic activity and inflation to the three oil price shocks are not sensitive 
to the ordering of the variables in the model. 
5.4.3 Structural Differences: The Role of Oil-Intensity 
Table 5.10 summarizes the role of oil and total energy use across oil-importing 
OECD countries. All figures are obtained from the IEA and are calculated as averages per 
unit of Purchasing Power Parity-weighted GDP from 1980-2013 for each country. To 
evaluate whether structural differences matter for the impact of oil shocks, I focus on the 
role of oil intensity defined as the percent of oil consumption in total energy consumption. 
I divided the sample into two groups using an average oil-intensity of 54% as cut-off.12 As 
12 Given the small oil-intensity margin between low and high oil-intensive countries, from 52% to 57%, I 
test whether the difference is statistically significant and find that the null hypothesis of no difference can 
be rejected at the 10% level (Appendix C). 
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shown in Table 5.7, OECD oil importers with low oil-intensity include Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, France, Italy, and the United States. Those with 
high oil-intensity include Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.  
Estimating a VAR model in Eq. (5.1) with j representing the two groupings, I find 
that, after an unfavorable oil supply shock, low oil-intensive OECD countries typically face 
modest inflationary pressures, whereas the inflationary pressures are strong and persistent 
in high oil-intensive OECD countries. The recessionary effects are also lower in the former 
group (Figure 5.5). In contrast to the differential effects of oil supply shocks, the effects of 
oil demand shocks driven by global economic activity and precautionary demand motives 
turn out to be very similar across the two groups (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). When the oil price 
shock is caused by increased global economic activity or a rise in precautionary demand, 
both groups experience a temporary increase and transitory decline in real economic 
output, respectively. The inflationary effects of the demand shocks are strong and identical 
for both groups. These findings suggest that oil-intensity can explain the differences in the 
effects of oil supply shocks across oil-importing OECD countries but it cannot explain the 
difference in the effects of oil demand shocks. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigated the causes and macroeconomic effects of oil price 
shocks on 14 OECD oil-importing countries using quarterly data from 1980-2013. In 
particular, I used the structural VAR model to disentangle oil price shocks and examine 
their macroeconomic effects on inflation and real GDP. My decomposition of structural 
shocks in the global oil market show that fluctuations in the price of oil are driven by three 
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distinct shocks. While each shock is associated with an increase in the price of oil, the 
macroeconomic effects of the shocks on oil-importing OECD countries crucially depend 
on the source of the shift. I find that increases in the price of oil driven by oil supply shocks 
and precautionary demand shocks are inflationary and unfavorable to economic growth 
while increases in the price of oil driven by aggregate demand shocks are inflationary and 
favorable to economic growth.  
Also, I evaluated whether structural differences matter for the impact of oil shocks 
across the countries focusing on the role of oil-intensity defined as the percent of oil 
consumption in total energy consumption. My findings reveal that OECD oil-importing 
countries with relatively high oil-intensity are vulnerable to supply-driven oil price shocks 
as they experience stronger inflationary pressures and decline in real output. Since 
monetary accommodation could exacerbate the inflationary pressures, supply-oriented 
policies that target the production side of the economy appear more appropriate as they 
could provide price relief while augmenting real output. These policies include reduction 
in employers’ payroll taxes and depreciation allowances for energy-conserving 
investments. The latter could lead to substantial energy savings, reduction in oil 











Structural shocks Qoil Yw Poil Yj Pj 
Oil supply shock < 0 ≤ 0 > 0   
Aggregate demand shock > 0 > 0 > 0   




Table 5.2  
List of 14 OECD countries 




Austria 3.21% 2.70% 
Belgium 1.92% 2.98% 
Finland 2.31% 3.52% 
France 1.84% 3.42% 
Germany 1.73% 2.27% 
Ireland 4.19% 4.48% 
Italy 1.28% 5.44% 
Japan 2.10% 1.00% 
Netherlands 2.13% 2.44% 
Portugal 1.97% 7.91% 
Spain 2.25% 5.39% 
Sweden 2.07% 3.88% 
Switzerland 1.83% 1.93% 
United States 2.65% 3.52% 
Average 2.25% 3.63% 
Notes: Averages based on annual inflation and real GDP data from 1980-2013 obtained 













Table 5.3  













Mean 2.24% 2.16% 3.63% 3.64% 
Median 2.37% 2.29% 2.48% 2.51% 
Max 10.86% 10.94% 28.38% 28.32% 
Min -8.27% -8.32% -4.50% -4.51% 
Std. dev 2.39% 2.39% 3.97% 3.98% 
Skewness -0.401 -0.343 2.571 2.510 
Kurtosis 5.150 5.262 11.075 11.051 
Notes: Real GDP and inflation rate data from OECD Statistics. Weighted real GDP growth and weighted inflation rate 
are based on author’s calculations. Weighted Real GDP growth is calculated using PPP-GDP country weights in 




Table 5.4  
Unit root test 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Null: series not stationary 
          Variables Test statistics  
Oil-related  
Oil production (Qoil) -6.319*** (0.000) 
Real economic activity (Yw) -3.103** (0.039) 




Real GDP (Y) -5.741*** (0.000) 
Inflation (P) -2.867* (0.052) 
Notes: Data on all oil-related variables are obtained from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). The oil price 
variable used is the nominal refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil, which is considered to be the best proxy for the 
global price of imported crude oil in the literature. The world economic activity indicator is proposed in Kilian (2009) and 
available on his research webpage. Inflation and real GDP data for the 14 OECD oil-importers are obtained from OECD Main 
Economic Indicators (MEI) database. The oil market variables, oil production, global real economic activity, and real oil price 
are expressed in detrended logs. Inflation and real GDP are expressed in percent changes. Probabilities in parenthesis. For all 






Table 5.5  
Cointegration test 
Johansen Cointegration Test 
Null: no cointegration 
Hypothesized # of  
cointegrating equations 
Test statistic  
None * 118.332*** (0.000) 
At most 1 * 70.487*** (0.000) 
At most 2 * 39.548*** (0.003) 
At most 3 * 19.874*** (0.010) 




Table 5.6  
VAR lag length by country 














United States 3 
Average 2 







Figure 5.1 Response of real price of oil to one-standard deviation structural shocks 
 
 





















































































































 VAR residual serial correlation LM tests 
Null: no serial correlation at lag order h 
 
Lags LM-Stat 
1  32.138 
   (0.154) 
2  34.31 
   (0.101) 
3  35.584 
    (0.078) 
4  51.134† 
     (0.001) 
5  36.523 
    (0.064) 
6 31.075 
(0.187) 
Notes: Probabilities in parenthesis. † denotes first acceptance of the 




Table 5.8  
VAR residual normality tests 
Null: residuals are multivariate normal 
 
Jarque-Bera  
joint test statistic  
428.4370 
     (0.000) 
Notes: Probabilities in parenthesis. Null rejected at 1% level of 














Table 5.9  
VAR residual heteroskedasticity tests 
Null: no heteroskedasticity 
 
Chi-square joint test 
statistic  
5079.841 
     (0.000) 
Notes: Probabilities in parenthesis. Null rejected at 1% level of 
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Notes: Eigenvalues represented by blue dots. Parameters in the 
models are stable over time if all the eigenvalues of the 













Finland 70.41 58.31 150.23 38% 
Sweden 60.05 51.35 119.43 42% 
Austria 40.45 38.1 84.72 45% 
Germany 48.4 42.72 91.33 47% 
Italy 45.32 33.77 66.45 51% 
France 48.38 42.61 82.73 51% 
Belgium 80.57 56.44 109.61 51% 
United States 39.55 69.84 133.96 52% 
High oil-intensity 
Ireland 60.24 47.58 85.08 57% 
Japan 68.45 48.1 99.43 58% 
Netherlands 39.44 35.15 58.36 60% 
Portugal 55.98 41.84 67 62% 
Spain 56.85 40.75 65.09 63% 
Switzerland 67.13 76.75 104.77 77% 
a,b,cAverages for the period 1980–2013 based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data measured as (tons of oil 
equivalent)/GDP (million USD, PPP weighted).  
dAverages for the period 1980–2013 calculated as oil consumption in percent of total energy consumption, all PPP GDP weighted. 
Figure 5.5 Impulse response by oil supply shock and oil-intensity 
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Figure 5.6 Impulse response by aggregate demand shock and oil-intensity 










This dissertation extends recent advances in the oil shocks literature to investigate 
the underlying causes of oil price shocks and examines the macroeconomic effects of the 
shocks on oil-importing countries. Several interesting results emerge from the analysis. 
First, oil price shocks are found to be caused by distinct supply and demand shocks: an oil 
supply shock caused by disruptions in global oil production, an aggregate demand shock 
driven by global economic activity, and an oil-specific demand shock driven by 
precautionary motives. An unexpected oil supply disruption causes a modest transitory 
increase in the real price of oil; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand triggers a 
strong increase in the real price of oil; and an unanticipated increase in precautionary 
demand for oil triggers an immediate and large increase in the real price of oil. 
Second, for a sample of 30 oil-importing countries (OECD and non-OECD), import 
demand for oil is found to be less sensitive to oil price shocks driven by supply disturbances 
but highly sensitive to oil price shocks driven by aggregate demand and precautionary 
demand shocks. Dividing the sample into OECD and non-OECD, the findings reveal that 
while OECD and non-OECD oil-importing countries are identical in their responses to oil 






Third, for a subsample that constitute 14 oil-importing OECD countries, the 
dissertation finds that increases in the price of oil driven by oil supply shocks and 
precautionary demand shocks are inflationary and unfavorable to economic growth while 
increases in the price of oil driven by aggregate demand shocks are inflationary and 
favorable to economic growth. Examining whether structural differences matter for the 
impact of oil shocks across countries focusing on the role of oil intensity, the findings show 
that, after an unfavorable oil supply shock, low oil-intensive OECD countries typically face 
modest inflationary pressures, whereas the inflationary pressures are strong and persistent 
in high oil-intensive OECD countries. The recessionary effects are also lower in the former 
group. In contrast, when the oil price shock is caused by increased global economic activity 
or a rise in precautionary demand, both groups experience a temporary increase and 
transitory decline in real economic output, respectively. The inflationary effects of the 
demand shocks are strong and identical for both groups. 
The dissertation contributes to the literature in three key respects. First, the 
decomposition of the structural disturbances to the real price of oil provides new evidence 
that the increase in the real price of oil between 2009 and 2010 is driven in most part by 
aggregate demand shocks despite the sluggish global economic activity post-2008 
recession. However, the increase in the real price of oil from 2011 to 2013, is driven mainly 
by precautionary demand motives due to uncertainties about future oil supply shortfalls. 
Supply disturbances played a marginal role during these two periods. 
Second, the dissertation provides new evidence that changes in oil import demand 
across oil-importing countries (OECD and non-OECD) is not only responsive to supply-





driven and precautionary demand-driven oil price shocks. In particular, supply-driven oil 
price shocks cause mild transitory decrease in oil import demand whereas demand-driven 
oil price shocks (aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks) trigger a strong 
increase in oil import demand. 
Finally, the dissertation adds to the literature by providing new evidence that oil 
intensity – defined as the percent of oil consumption in total energy consumption – can 
explain the differences in the effects of oil supply shocks across oil-importing OECD 
countries but it cannot explain the differences in the effects of aggregate demand and 
precautionary demand shocks. 
At a more general level, the essential gist of the dissertation is that oil price shocks 
originate from distinct supply and demand shocks and that the macroeconomic effects of 












































































 Elasticity of crude import demand to oil supply shock (by country) 
Model 1 









 Elasticity of crude import demand to oil supply shock (by country) 
Model 2 







 Elasticity of crude import demand to oil supply shock (by country) 
Model 3 













 Elasticity of crude import demand to aggregate demand shock (by country) 
Model 4 













 Elasticity of crude import demand to aggregate demand shock (by country) 
Model 5 









 Elasticity of crude import demand to aggregate demand shock (by country) 
Model 6 







 Elasticity of crude import demand to precautionary demand shock (by country) 
Model 7 













 Elasticity of crude import demand to precautionary demand shock (by country) 
Model 8 













 Elasticity of crude import demand to precautionary demand shock (by country) 
Model 9 























Figure C.2 Robustness check using 4 lags 
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Figure C.3 Robustness check using 5 lags 
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Notes: The oil-intensity margin between low and high oil-intensive countries is small: from 52% 
to 57%. Based on the t-statistic of the covariance analysis, the null hypothesis of no difference can 
be rejected at the 10% level.  
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